THE SEC’S SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
RULE: CREATING A CORPORATE PUBLIC
SQUARE
James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas
In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s
goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal
rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom
insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the
public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum
would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards
of directors as a fount of current and useful information about
their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.
We therefore rethink the mission of Rule 14a-8. In doing so,
we explore whether it can provide a ready-made corporate
public square for all companies; that is, rather than view Rule
14a-8 as purely enabling shareholders to sample the beliefs of
their fellow shareholders, we perceive a broader social value.
We cast Rule 14a-8 as a mechanism for assisting corporate
directors generally, meaning not just those on the board of the
corporation that is the target of a proposal, but also directors
at all corporations, in gathering valuable information to help
them better perform their duties.
In making these claims, we fully accept the functional view
that Rule 14a-8 addresses itself to shareholders facing high
barriers to their efforts to communicate with their directors
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and among themselves by providing them with an inexpensive
vehicle for making their views known. We also believe it is
equally important to understand that the message derived
from proposals, and the votes they garner, is also heard by
managers of other companies. We see that the temperature
being taken through Rule 14a-8 is not just that of the
proponent but a broad group of the company’s stockholders
that likely is reflective of societal beliefs.
Construing Rule 14a-8 to facilitate a public square will
weaken the social and psychological forces that can insulate
management and the board from alternative perspectives
regarding the firm’s objectives. Board directors often live
cloistered lives and naturally identify with the firm’s successes
and the operating practices. Thus, as their length of service
increases, directors risk failing to broaden their perspectives to
reflect the constellation of views held by the shareholders.
Overall, a public square could help directors preserve and even
gain a far richer and aligned perspective.
Moreover, as opposed to one-off meetings with portfolio
companies, voting on shareholder proposals provides both the
chance to discern the views of other financial institutions and
the opportunity to present a cohesive voice across a group of
investors behind a recommended course of action set forth in a
proposal.
To be sure, some conditions should be imposed on
proponents to guard against abusive proposals. We review the
data bearing on the extent that a small group of investors, socalled “gadflies,” produce a disproportionate number of the
poorly tailored proposals and hence are a distraction, and we
believe that the SEC should study whether their proposals are
associated with negative returns.
We conclude that recent SEC amendments to Rule 14a-8 are
ill-advised. In making these changes, the SEC assessed the
value of Rule 14a-8 by narrowly focusing on votes garnered by
proposals. We argue the worth of this rule has many more
features than the outcome of the votes cast in favor of a
proposal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law is once again at an important crossroad.
Institutional and individual investors now evince a growing
and animated interest in environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) issues that is also mirrored by firm
managers’ public statements regarding the focus of their
stewardship.1 At the same time, an aging American workforce
financially ill-prepared for retirement is seeking increased
economic returns from the funds on which their retirements

1 See, e.g., José Azar et al., The Big Three and Corporate Carbon
Emissions Around the World, 142 J. Fin. Econ. 674, 674–75 (2021) (noting
how the largest institutional investors increasingly engage with firms on
issue of high CO2 emissions); Michael Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H.
Webber, The Millennial Corporation (Dec. 14, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3918443
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (marshalling evidence and
arguments that the growing influence of millennials will propel a dramatic
shift within the executive suites toward stakeholder interests and socially
responsible choices so that traditional obeisance to wealth maximization
will be reduced).
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depend.2 Hence, the pursuit of gain, not good, is the other fork
in the road.
Caught in the middle of these intersecting forces are firm
managers—board members and officers—who are challenged
to address both sets of concerns. The path forward, however,
is confounded by the diverse nature of firms seeking to
traverse this intersection—American public companies cover
an enormous range of industries, employees, shareholders,
debtholders, customers, and suppliers, in a wide variety of
geographic areas of operation. Indeed, public companies
impact, and are impacted by, a broad range of investors and
other stakeholders. As such, their directors face the challenge
of obtaining good information regarding the aspirations,
values, and needs of their investors and stakeholders,
particularly with regard to the managers’ stewardship of the
firm as well as the directors’ level of accountability. 3 Boards
of directors depend heavily on corporate management for this
information, which may leave them unaware of various
stakeholders’ beliefs and needs4 or simply poorly focused on
shareholders’ concerns; they may also not be aware of smaller
shareholders views due to their significant collective action
problems and steep communication barriers.5 All these issues

2 Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Security: Fixing
the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings,
91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 938–39 (2006) (describing the looming American
retirement crisis).
3 DAVID M. SILK, SABASTIAN V. NILLES & CARMEN X. W. LU, WACHTELL,
LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, ESG AND SUSTAINABILITY: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
2021
(2021),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.2733
2.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP6L-TVND] (“As investor and stakeholder
scrutiny of ESG continues to accelerate, boards will also continue to face
heightened expectations on their oversight of ESG.”).
4 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Resisting the Return to
Managerialism: Institutionalizing the Shareholder Voice in the Monitoring
Model, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1275 (2021) (discussing boards’ lack of independent
sources of information and need for alternative information flows in order
to be well informed).
5 See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
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exist at a time when major companies’ boards of directors are
increasingly and aggressively seeking input from their
shareholders on their wide-ranging beliefs and concerns.6
Social-psychological forces further complicate the
balancing act required of today’s directors of public
companies.7 Studies reflect that since the last major change
in corporate governance—the movement from managerialism
to the share-value centric objective pursued by officers under
the watchful eye of an independent board of directors— an
inverse relationship has evolved between the tenure of officers
and board member independence.8 With greater board
independence, the average tenure of directors has increased.9
In fact, the average tenure of directors exceeds that of chief
1359, 1370, 1379, 1384 (2014) (discussing shareholders’ collective action
problems in voting).
6 For example, Unilever recently voluntarily instituted an advisory
shareholder vote on climate change issues. See Sabira Chaudhuri, Unilever
Allows Climate Input, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2020, 1:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unilever-to-give-investors-advisory-vote-onclimate-change-plan-11607971421 (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review). In addition, “[m]ajor investors are putting more emphasis on
addressing the threats posed by climate change, with shareholder
resolutions on the issue becoming more common.” Id.
7 See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 84–85 (providing a
psychological perspective on “independent directors’ assessment whether
the corporation’s interest is served by a derivative suit against their ‘insider’
colleagues” and concluding that social-psychological mechanisms produce
bias in directors’ decisions that protect colleagues on the board from legal
sanctions).
8 See e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover,
20 J. Fin. Econ. 431, 458 (1987) (finding that CEO turnover as observed
during 1974-1983 was more likely correlated with poor firm performance
when the board is dominated by independent directors); Eliezer M. Fich &
Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 689, 714
(2006) (observing in a study of Forbes 500 firms during 1989-1995 high
correlation between executive turnovers of poorly performing firms and the
independence of directors).
9 See Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Director
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 97, 113 & n., 132 & tbl.3 (2016) (finding that
average director tenure has increased).
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executive officers.10 With insufficient turnover in the
membership of the board of directors arises a host of concerns,
not the least of which is undue obeisance to the status quo. 11
This can manifest itself by the board, and hence company
policies and practices, becoming increasingly insular and thus
removed from the interests of the firm’s shareholders as well
as the markets the firm seeks to serve.
We are taking advantage of this Symposium’s mission to
think broadly in casting a future role for securities
regulation.12 To this charge, we set forth a vision for
addressing boardroom insularity by trying to incorporate a
feature from a less complicated setting in which the smaller
and privately held firm can advance by resorting to the model
of the local public or town square. Historically, “[t]he town
square was an integral city function for centuries throughout
the world. It was the central hub of activity, a place for
gathering to celebrate, receive information, conduct business,
and to simply sit.”13 There, citizens of the same community
could gather with business owners and share views likely
derived from commonly observed and experienced
developments.14 The Greeks are widely recognized as the first
society to fully embrace the value of civic engagement through
the public square.15 The Greek Agora in fifth century A.D. was
constructed specifically for this purpose, serving as the nerve
Id. at 124.
Yaron Nili details a host of other concerns with longer director
tenures, including affecting director independence, creating a “structural
bias,” and leading to groupthink. Id. at 118–20.
12 See Introduction, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 472, 475 (2021) (“The
Symposium intends to jumpstart scholarly efforts to develop guidance for
courts, lawmakers, and market participants.”).
13 Stephanie Rouse, A Return to the Town Square 1 (June 6, 2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58b2397a2e69cf75a40cc057/t/5999e7
1b4c0dbfbeebed458a/1503258400531/A+Return+to+the+Town+Square+by
+Stephanie+Rouse.pdf [https://perma.cc/66UV-Z8NW].
14 Id. (“Before technology took off and created an environment that
allowed for information at your fingertips, individuals gathered in town
squares to share information, discuss politics and transact business.”).
15 Id. at 3.
10
11
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center of the city of Athens and hosted up to twenty thousand
citizens to engage in civil discourse.16 Political theorist and
philosopher Hanna Arendt wrote, “[T]o the Greek way of
thinking, freedom was rooted in place, bound to one spot and
limited in its dimensions, and the limits of freedom’s space
were congruent with the walls of the city, of the polis or, more
precisely, the agora contained within it.”17
Expanding on the Agora, European squares were designed
physically as well as philosophically to sit at the heart of the
city, functioning as important local and regional economic
hubs for trade, civil engagement, and entertainment.18 The
multi-functional square “was a uniquely European invention,
intimately connected to the development of democratic and
representational self-government.”19 The early American
tradition of town squares is borrowed directly from the
European one.20 In this country, these early squares were
simply informal gathering places located in the middle of the
town, allowing civic engagement to take place out in the open
where all could participate.21
This quaint, perhaps romantic, image hardly characterizes
the setting of today’s public companies. In a multinational,
high-tech, COVID-fearing world, it is no longer possible to
make a trip to the local pub to gauge your fellow investors’
feelings. Nonetheless, we invoke the analogy to the public
square, as we believe the existence of such a forum would
redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of
directors as a fount of current and useful information about
their investors and stakeholders’ concerns.
In this Article, we rethink the shareholder proposal rule,
Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Rule” or “Rule
14a-8”).22 In doing so, we explore whether it can provide a
16
17

Id.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE

OF

POLITICS 170 (Jerome Kohn ed.,

2005).
18
19
20
21
22

Rouse, supra note 13, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021).
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ready-made corporate public square for all companies; that is,
rather than view Rule 14a-8 as purely enabling shareholders
to sample the beliefs of fellow shareholders, we perceive a
broader social value. We cast Rule 14a-8 as a mechanism for
assisting corporate directors generally, meaning not just those
on the board of the corporation that is the target of a proposal,
but directors at all corporations, in gathering valuable
information to help them better perform their duties. For
example, the Rule can enable all directors to inform
themselves about issues that require them to balance the
effect of their actions on their firm’s stock price and on other
interests of their company.23
In making these claims, we fully accept the functional view
that Rule 14a-8 addresses itself to shareholders facing high
barriers to their efforts to communicate with directors and
among themselves by providing them with an inexpensive
vehicle for making their views known.24 In essence, the
functional view of the Rule is that it facilitates both
shareholder communication and engagement by solving the
collective action problem facing small investors, which in turn
enables the board to take the temperature of a representative
body of the firm’s shareholders on a wide range of issues. We
support this view but we believe it is equally important to
understand that the message derived from proposals, and the
votes they garner, is also heard by managers of companies
that were not directly targeted by the proposal. Indeed, the
record reflects that these “shareholder votes can lead to
important corporate governance changes,”25 and thus
supports the view that corporate boards pay attention to

23 One of the important functions of shareholder voting is “when there
is an issue that requires a balancing between the share price and other
legitimate interests of the company.” Randall S. Thomas & Paul H.
Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public
Companies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459, 468
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
24 See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of
the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L. J. 635, 639 (1977).
25 Edelman et al., supra note 5, at 1369 (citation omitted).
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them.26 As such, directors who ignore issues and voting
outcomes at other firms are ignoring valuable information.
We further accept the view that other stakeholders can use
Rule 14a-8 to communicate their interests to corporate boards,
if they are willing to purchase a certain amount of stock in the
corporation and phrase their proposals appropriately.27 With
the surging interest among investors and managers
concerning ESG, and especially matters bearing on
sustainability, there has been a distinct tilt toward believing
that boards in addressing sustainability explicitly need to
take into account stakeholder interests in their decisionmaking.28
A further benefit of construing Rule 14a-8 to facilitate a
public square is the weakening of the social and psychological
forces that can insulate management and the board from
alternative perspectives regarding the objectives of the firm
and how they can be achieved. Boards live a cloistered life and
their insularity sometimes is enhanced by practices of
26 We do not limit ourselves to precatory votes because some 14a-8
votes may require a bylaw to be adopted. See, e.g., Matthew F. Sullivan,
Shareholder Bylaw Proposals, Delaware Certification, and the SEC
After CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 87 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 193, 195–201 (2010).
27 Labor unions have been especially aggressive in using the rule in
this fashion. See John G. Matsusaka et. al., Opportunistic Proposals by
Union Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUDS. 3215, 3219–3220 (2019). While
companies sometimes object to these investors’ dual interests, arguing that
these proposals should be stricken on various grounds, frequently they
concede the point and allow a shareholder vote on the proposal.
28 Indeed, the public square vision complements the view that
corporations are besieged by not just their owners but a wide range of
stakeholders to address interests beyond maximizing the value of the firm.
See Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra note 1. One prominent movement in
this direction revolves around the so-called New Paradigm. For further
discussion of this stakeholder-oriented vision of corporate governance, see
MARTIN LIPTON ET AL., WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ & INT’L BUS.
COUNCIL, WORLD ECON. F., THE NEW PARADIGM: A ROADMAP FOR AN IMPLICIT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATIONS AND
INVESTORS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
5
(2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pd
f [https://perma.cc/2ZHJ-GXM6].
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corporate management.29 Through years of service, directors
naturally identify with the firm’s successes and the operating
practices that produce the successes enjoyed. They risk being
stewards of the status quo and not monitors of the
stewardship of the officers. Thus, as their length of service
increases, a director risks failing to broaden their perspective
to reflect the constellation of views held by the shareholders.
A public square in which shareholders could voice their views
could therefore help directors preserve and even gain a far
richer and aligned perspective.
Given these important purposes, how can the
shareholders’ beliefs best be communicated in a coordinated
way? In theory and practice, institutional investors’ holdings
are sufficiently large to economically support minimal
interaction with portfolio companies.30 Nevertheless, as
Professors Gilson and Gordon note, most of these investors are
“rationally reticent” to initiate in a public fashion a campaign
to persuade management and other holders to pursue a course
of action.31 This in part is a consequence of inherent conflicts
faced by many institutions, such as the fact their business
models may be jeopardized by overt criticism of a portfolio
company’s management that may also be a prospective client
for its services.32 Moreover, the dramatic shift to indexed
investing is built on a model of low administrative costs, which
does not enable resources to be directed toward raising issues
for management.33 Thus, among the largest group of
29 See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the
Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L. J. 262, 276 (2016) (“[F]rom
the earliest stages of the process, corporate management oversees the
submission process [for shareholder proposals], identifying excludable
proposals and communicating with shareholders.”).
30 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look
at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 130 (1994).
31 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
32 Edelman et al., supra note 5 at 1402–03.
33 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
2020, 2050–55 (2019).
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investors, financial institutions, few have or can be expected
to initiate communications to boards of their portfolio
companies. Yet, they can and do make themselves heard by
voting in favor of initiatives they believe are in the best
interests of their beneficial owners and by withholding votes
for directors as a means to communicate their unhappiness.34
There is growing trend of index funds supporting
shareholder proposals and otherwise signaling disapproval of
board actions.35 Moreover, there is reason to believe this trend
will become even more observable as index funds compete for
34 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 31, at 887 (“[W]hile mutual funds
are not proactive, they are not passive . . . They very frequently oppose
management on core corporate governance issues. . . . when the issue is
presented to them.”); see also Brooke Fox, “Against” Votes by Institutional
Investors
Spike,
AGENDA:
A
FIN.
TIMES
SERV.,
https://www.astfinancial.com/media/374142/against-votes-by-institutionalinvestors-spike.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU24-DGPK] (“As Agenda has
reported, Vanguard Group, BlackRock Inc, State Street Global Advisors and
Fidelity all announced new initiatives that suggested they would impose a
higher level of scrutiny on directors of companies in their portfolios to elicit
changes that were in the best interests of their shareholders. As it turns
out, they’re being true to their word.”).
35 See e.g., Dawn Lim & Justin Baer, BlackRock, Other Investors Target
Climate Issues, Covid-19 Response and Board Seats in Shareholder Votes,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
12,
2021,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-other-investors-wield-growingboard-shareholder-vote-clout-11628766001 (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review) (noting fund giant Blackrock, Inc. in the year ending
June 30, 2021, withheld support for ten percent of all director nominees and
backed sixty-four percent of the year’s environmental shareholder
proposals.); Marc Treviño, June M. Hu & Joshua L. Levin, 2021 Proxy
Season Review: Shareholder Proposals on Environmental Matters, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Aug.
11,
2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/11/2021-proxy-season-reviewshareholder-proposals-on-environmental-matters/ [https://perma.cc/W5PN5SXU] (noting that Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) supported
sixty-four percent of environmental proposals in the year ending June
2021). One regularly watched metric is the number of companies whose
board nominees received eighty percent or more of the votes cast. Lim &
Baer, supra. In the year ending June 30, 2021, six percent of companysupported board candidates among companies in the Russell 3000 firms
failed to garner at least eighty percent of shareholder support, the largest
percentage in since 2017. Id.
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the wealth of millennials, an investor group widely seen as
deeply valuing ESG, and as fund managers, especially those
following a passive strategy, continue to promote their funds
aggressively by trumpeting their voting commitments to
ESG.36 As such, these funds will be expected to be consumers
of the information embedded in well-crafted ESG proposals.
Hence, the temperature being taken is not just that of the
proponent but a broad group of the company’s stockholders
that likely is reflective of societal beliefs. However, given the
relatively few formal communication channels for
stakeholders to pass their unvarnished views directly to
corporate boards, Rule 14a-8 can be a vehicle to distribute
their views more directly to boards that are committed to
stakeholder primacy.37 To the extent that the legislative
history of the Rule is unclear about supporting our view, we
argue that it should be expanded by Congress to remove such
doubts.
There is another advantage afforded to institutional
investors by Rule 14a-8 proposals. As experience shows, even
though many institutional investors are rationally reticent to
initiate proposals, they do vote and in doing so support
proposals they believe are well crafted.38 Additionally, many
institutions regularly meet with some or even many of their
portfolio companies.39 Missing from these one-off
engagements, however, is both the chance to discern the views
of other financial institutions and the opportunity to present
a cohesive voice across a group of investors behind a
recommended course of action set forth in a proposal.
Moreover, these one-off discussions and their results are not

36 Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder
Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1303–1305 (2020).
37 See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 23, at 468. (arguing that a
shareholder vote provides a measure of shareholders’ intensity of
preferences and aggregates the preferences of the shareholders as well as
conveying that information to the board, which puts the board “in a better
position to balance the interests of the various stakeholders of the firm.”).
38 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 31, at 867, 887–88.
39 Id.
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nearly as transparent as the results of votes on shareholder
proposals. That is, voting on proposals through the Rule 14a8 mechanism not only informs financial institutions regarding
the beliefs of other institutions, but it does so with the result
that their collective sentiment is aggregated in the vote tally,
thereby adding force to the view of the individual institutional
investor.40 And, equally significant, is that Rule 14a-8 enables
overt coordination among institutions. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules allow, in connection with
proxy solicitations, soft coordination among institutions by
permitting them to not just announce how they will vote but
also to encourage other institutions to similarly act.41 Outside
the proxy voting environment, such active coordination poses
regulatory concerns among large investors who may fear their
actions may unintentionally cross the line into requiring
compliance with the securities laws’ early notice provisions or
even trigger an aggressive poison pill provision.42 Hence,
shareholder proposals enable coordination among institutions
and the shareholder proposal itself is the focus for such
coordination.
We share Professor Jonathan Macey’s insightful
explanation of the cause for rising interest in ESG
considerations among investors as a growing belief that
government cannot address contemporary social problems so

40 See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62
VAND. L. REV. 127, 144 (2009); Thomas & Edelman, supra note 23, at 468.
41 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l-2(iv) (2021) (exempting communications in
a regular basis that state how shareholder will vote, and reasons for so
voting, from proxy regulation); id. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (exempting
communication from most proxy rules a communication by one who does not
solicit proxies and is not have certain self-interested relationships with the
registrant); id. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (creating broad exemption for soliciting
where no more than ten persons are approached).
42 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Vote Suppression: The Anti-Activist
Pill in Williams Companies Stockholder Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Aug. 19, 2021), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/08/19/corporatevote-suppression-the-anti-activist-pill-in-the-williams-companiesstockholder-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/99EX-FM8S] (closely examining
legal perils of institutions following parallel course in the context of broadly
worded poison pills with low ownership threshold).
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that reliance on the private sector, most significantly
businesses, is necessary for solutions to social problems.43 At
the same time, we part company with him in our hopefulness
that incorporating the private sector will be successful. Macey
wisely raises concerns that shareholders’ focus on ESG faces
formidable practical obstacles, such as firm managers being
largely compensated by bonuses linked to the bottom line,
being elected by owners, not other constituencies, and being
subject to pressures from activist investors focused on
financial performance.44 We do not disagree with these
concerns, but we believe Rule 14a-8 can nurture the public
square so that the rising interest in ESG can more fully be
gauged by the public company boards as they navigate among
these dueling forces.
With this plethora of valuable purposes to serve, we find it
surprising that the SEC, at the behest of corporate
management, has recently sharply raised the requirements
shareholders must meet to use the Rule.45 Upon proposing the
cuts (“Proposing Release”), the SEC observed that a handful
of individual investors account for a sizable proportion of all
proposals.46 In adopting the final rules, it also raised concerns
regarding the costs proponents with small stakes impose on
companies and their shareholders through their proposals.47

43 Jonathan R. Macey, ESG Investing: Why Here? Why Now? 2 (George
Mason Law & Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No., 21-22, 2021)
http://ssrn.com/absteact=3942903 (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
44 Id. at 25-29.
45 See infra Section III.A for discussion of these cutbacks.
46 See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 87,458, 84 Fed. Reg.
66,458, 66,483 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
[hereinafter Proposing Release] (relying on evidence that five individuals
accounted for twenty-seven percent of all proposals to S&P 1500 firms
during 2003-2014.).
47 Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 89, 964, 84 Fed. Reg.
70,240, 70,245 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (estimating
the cost to the company in addressing proposals to be between $50,000 and
$150,000 per proposal). The SEC also recounted its repeated observations
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In addition, critics have argued that environmental and social
proposals have not increased firm value.48
We believe all boards should wish to learn about their
investors’ views concerning corporate governance issues, and
boards, whether stakeholder-oriented or not, should believe it
is in their interest to learn whether there are broadly held
views regarding environmental and social issues impacted by
the firm. While some conditions should be imposed on
proponents to guard against abusive proposals, the data
reviewed below shows that the former rule did a reasonable
job of filtering out those proposals from meritorious ones. 49
Moreover, to the extent that a small group of investors, socalled “gadflies,” produce a disproportionate number of the
poorly tailored proposals and hence are a distraction, we
believe that the SEC should study whether their proposals are
associated with negative returns—as one of the studies
reviewed below finds50—and, if so, consider why this might be
the case. After such study, the SEC can craft an appropriate
regulatory response. We envision the SEC carefully studying
the question of how gadfly proposals may differ from proposals
submitted by other less active individual investors. Just why
is it likely that this group’s proposals differ in impact from
those of the average proponent? This inquiry could provide the
basis for a searching cost-benefit analysis that could even lead
to setting a limit on the total number of shareholder proposals
that any individual can present annually at all public
that Rule 14a-8 can be subject to misuse and even harassment. Id. at 70,241
n.2.
48 The empirical evidence on the financial effects of environmental and
social shareholder proposals is mixed. Yazhou He, Bige Kahraman &
Michelle Lowry, ES Risks and Shareholder Voice 1 n.1 (ECGI, Working
Paper No. 786/2021, 2021) (collecting studies finding financial benefits as
well as those not finding benefits).
49 See e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can
Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from Securities and
Exchange Commission No-Action Letter Decisions, 64 J. LAW & ECON 107,
125–26 (2021) (finding statistically significant positive returns associated
with SEC’s decision to omit shareholder proposal thus supporting the view
that this mechanism discriminates against negative value proposals).
50 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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companies. We review data below that suggests this course of
action.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we provide an
overview of Rule 14a-8 and its broad range of uses in the areas
of corporate governance and social responsibility. Part III
offers a wide-ranging inquiry into the mechanics, legislative
history, academic commentary, and judicial evolution of Rule
14a-8. We find that the Rule has implications that eclipse its
role solely as a vehicle for shareholder voting on discrete
issues. In Part IV, we next turn to the empirical evidence
about Rule 14a-8: Its use by a broad variety of proponents,
especially by corporate gadflies, targeting a wide range of
topics and experiencing a diverse set of outcomes. In Part V,
we turn to our policy recommendation that Rule 14a-8 should
be viewed as a corporate public square, serving an important
role informing boards of their investors and stakeholders’
viewpoints. In Part VI, we conclude.

II. OVERVIEW OF RULE 14A-8
Rule 14a-8 allows a shareholder, subject to certain
limitations, to submit a proposal for inclusion in the corporate
proxy material, which will later be voted on by fellow
shareholders on the corporation’s proxy card.51 Shareholders
did not start to take significant advantage of Rule 14a-8 until
the 1960s and 1970s.52 Since that time, the rule has been often
used in two different settings: initiating corporate governance
changes and raising social responsibility issues.53

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021).
Kosmas Papadopoulos, The Long View: The Role of Shareholder
Proposals in Shaping U.S. Corporate Governance (2000-2018), HARV. L. SCH.
F.
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
6
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-long-view-the-role-ofshareholder-proposals-in-shaping-u-s-corporate-governance-2000-2018/
[https://perma.cc/RH32-CFD2].
53 Haan, supra note 29, at 272 (“The academic literature generally
divides shareholder proposals into a corporate governance category and a
social and environmental category.”) See generally Randall S. Thomas &
James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium:
51
52
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Governance proposals first appeared during the 1960s and
1970s, when certain individual investors initiated many
shareholder proposals on issues such as the repeal of classified
boards and the adoption of cumulative voting.54 In the late
1980s, institutional investors began submitting more
shareholder proposals “in response to the widespread
adoption of poison pills, payments of ‘greenmail,’ and other
acts by boards to entrench themselves in the wake of a wave
of ‘hostile’ takeovers.”55 Later, in the 1990s, shareholders
made a substantial number of proposals seeking governance
changes, including proposals to declassify boards, remove
poison pills, and curb executive pay.56 In the new millennium,
some highly-successfully shareholder proposal campaigns
influenced the broad adoption of various corporate governance
practices, such as requiring majority vote standards for
uncontested director elections and criticizing companies’ “say
on pay” policies.57 Rule 14a–8 also has been used to shine a
light on a broad range of social and environmental issues.
Most notable of these were anti-apartheid proposals seeking
to terminate a corporation’s business activities in South
Africa;58 proposals seeking to prohibit a corporation from
participating in the Arab boycott of Israel;59 proposals seeking
corporations to agree to comply with codes of environmental

Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP.
FIN. 368 (2007) (discussing developments in shareholder proposals).
54 Papadopoulos, supra note 52.
55 Id.
56 Id. Labor unions were very active on corporate governance issues.
See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018,
1019–20 (1998).
57 Papadopoulos, supra note 52.
58 See Philip A. Broyles, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on
Corporate Involvement in South Africa During the Reagan Era, INT’L REV.
MOD. SOCIOLOGY, Spring 1998, at 1, 6–7 (examining effects of shareholder
activism the Rule 14a-8 proposals and other methods of engagement).
59 See, e.g., Maya Mueller, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker
Barrel, Institutional Investors, and the 1998 Amendments, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 453, 509 n. 422 (1998).
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standards;60 and proposals seeking to terminate a
corporation’s manufacture or sale of armaments. 61 While
there is a broad range of proposals, they regularly are seen as
falling into two distinct groups—governance and
environmental/social—with the distinctions being of scope as
well as of substance.62 What the SEC’s data reflects is that,
initially, governance proposals on average garner a much
greater percentage of support from shareholders than do
social or environmental proposals.63 However, there are more
substantial increases in shareholder support on second and
third votes on social and environmental proposals, leading to
a similar rate of proposals that receive at least twenty-five
percent of shareholder support for governance, social, and
environmental proposals after resubmissions.64 In fact, social
and environmental proposals that initially fail to receive
majority support are more likely to be re-submitted than
governance proposals of the same category.65 Thus, the
steady, persistent efforts of their proponents shined a bright
light on a particular problem that needed fixing. Ultimately,
the repeated efforts garnered more votes, and in all cases the
60 Proposing Release, supra note 46, at 66,479, 66,480 fig.4, 66,484
fig.7B (capturing annual number of ESG proposals each year from 2004
through 2018).
61 See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir.1970) (leading decision on scope of Rule 14a-8 upholding proposal
in response to public company’s ongoing production of napalm for use in
Vietnam War).
62 See Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote
Speech at the Society for Corporate Governance National Conference (July
7,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-keynote-societycorporate-governance-national-conference-2020
[https://perma.cc/38UXQQGA] (“[C]orporate governance stands by itself and rarely has a direct
relationship to environmental or social issues. Best practices in corporate
governance are usually the result of many years of private ordering
experimentation and experience. Also, governance reform focuses on the
company itself and what is best for its optimal operation as well as its
shareholders. The same is not necessarily true of ‘E’ or ‘S.’ Those matters
tend to be more society, or stakeholder, focused.”).
63 Proposing Release, supra note 46, at 65,501 fig.10.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 66,500.
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proposal process shined a light on investor concerns.66 Like so
many worthwhile ideas, reflection over time, not instant
acceptance, leads to enduring change. We can appreciate that
Rule 14a-8 has been a means for introducing change that
aligns governance practices not just with owner preferences,
but also with social norms.
More important for the purposes of this Article is the role
Rule 14a-8 plays in raising and broadening the consciousness
of the company’s board and executives. Boards and executive
ranks are necessarily small relative to the body of
stockholders. Moreover, the perspective of board members,
though elected by the shareholders, is not a microcosm of the
shareholders and even less likely to be a microcosm of society
as a whole. We believe that well-crafted shareholder proposals
that seek reports, procedures, or other actions on a matter
already determined to be a proper subject of shareholder
action under applicable state law invite, and likely cause, the
directors and executives to reflect on an issue that may not
otherwise have been considered. Thus, we see that Rule 14a8 is a means by which concerned shareholders can gain some
attention within the boardroom and executive suite on a
matter and even introduce a fresh perspective for
consideration. The fruits of this perspective cannot be fully
measured ex ante; history now reflects that important
changes have been brought about in significant measure by
shareholder proposals, such as occurred with proposals
focused on majority vote resolutions, South Africa, and now
climate change.67
Despite these virtues, proposals are often viewed
negatively by corporate management.68 Evidence of this

Id. at 66,501 fig.10.
See supra notes 58–61.
68 See John G. Matsusak, Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder
Proposals? Evidence from No-Action Letter Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Jan
20,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/20/why-do-managers-fightshareholder-proposals-evidence-from-no-action-letter-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/J5EL-7W2N] (“Corporate managers, by and large, are
skeptical of shareholder proposals.”). Even some defense side law firms urge
66
67
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hostility is variously manifested. One direct reaction are
frequent refusals by a company to include proposals on their
ballot. Their refusal triggers the SEC no-action letter process,
whereby the SEC, after receiving materials from the company
and the proponent, determines whether to issue a no-action
letter.69 In most cases, if the SEC issues a no-action letter,
then the proposal is not included in the proxy statement.70
Another reaction by companies is to include the proposal in
management’s proxy solicitation alongside a detailed and long
explanation of why shareholders should reject the proposal.
Often
accompanying
management’s
rejection
recommendation is an attack on the proponent for being a
gadfly, a member of a small number of shareholders who
yearly account for a high percentage of shareholder proposals.
The charge that gadflies are not genuinely interested in the
company’s affairs is also a justification for the board’s refusal
to permit shareholders’ access to the company’s proxy
statement.71 We examine gadflies below.

III. THE MECHANICS, LEGISLATIVEREGULATORY HISTORY, AND COMMENTARY OF
RULE 14A-8
In this Part, we provide an overview of the legislative
history, regulatory and judicial developments, and the
academic commentary for Rule 14a-8; in doing so, we find
support for our vision of the Rule as a mechanism for creating
a corporate public square. We note at the outset that our focus
is on proposals that are not otherwise excludable by Rule 14aboard action on shareholder proposals that receive majority support by the
company’s shareholders. See Andrew R. Brownstein and Igor Kirman, Can
A Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote
Resolutions, BUS. LAWYER, Nov. 2004, at 23, 75 (lawyers from Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz arguing that “[f]ollowing a majority vote in favor of a
shareholder proposal, companies should include consideration of the matter
at an upcoming board meeting.”).
69 See Matsusaka et al., supra note 49, at 112–14.
70 Id. at 113.
71 Matsusaka et al., supra note 49, at 113 (listing statutory bases for
excluding shareholder proposals).
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8. The rule contains a variety of exclusions under which a
company can exclude a proposal from its proxy materials. 72
Among the many exclusions are that a proposal is not a proper
subject of shareholder action under state law,73 a violation of
law,74 false or misleading statement,75seeks to redress of a
personal claim or grievance76 or relates to operations
accounting for less than five percent of a company’s assets or
business.77 Rule 14a-8(j) sets forth the steps management
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021).
If, under the laws of the state in which the corporation is
incorporated, the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders,
the corporation is not required to include the shareholder proposal. Whether
a proposal is a proper subject for action by shareholders will depend on the
applicable state law. A proposal that mandates certain action by the board
of directors may not be a proper subject matter for shareholder action, while
a proposal recommending or requesting such action may be a proper subject.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
74 If the shareholder proposal would require the corporation to violate
state or federal law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction to which the
corporation is subject, the corporation need not include it. Id. § 240.14a8(i)(2).
75 If the shareholder proposal or supporting statement is false or
misleading, the corporation does not have to include it. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(3).
76 If the shareholder proposal concerns the redress of a personal claim
or grievance against the corporation or any other person, or is designed to
result in a benefit to the shareholder or to further a personal interest that
is not shared with the other shareholders at large, the corporation need not
include it. Id. § 240.14a-8(i) (4).
77 If the shareholder proposal relates to operations that account for less
than five percent of the corporation’s total assets and less than five percent
of its net earnings and gross sales, and is not otherwise significantly related
to the registrant’s business, the corporation does not have to include it. Id.
§ 240.14a-8(i)(1). In adopting the five percent standard, the SEC stated that
shareholder proposals must be included in the proxy statement,
notwithstanding their failure to reach the five percent threshold, “if a
significant relationship to the issuer’s business is demonstrated on the face
of the resolution or supporting statement.” Proposed Amendments to Rule
14a-8 Under the Security Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, Investment Company
Act Release No. 12,734, 47 Fed Reg. 47.420, 47,428 (proposed Oct. 14, 1982)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The meaning of “significantly related”
is not limited to economic significance. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(5)–(13)
contain a number of other restrictions; The corporation need not include a
72
73
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must follow to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials. 78
Duly qualified proposals thereafter appear in the company’s
proxy materials and, unless they are withdrawn, stockholders
vote upon them.79 As we find in Part V, proposals opposed by
management face a most uncertain fate; but of interest is that
even those that fail to garner majority approval thereafter do
lead to firms modifying their policies or practices in the wake
of such voting.80 However, the company sometimes ignores
proposals that garner majority approval.81 Of significance is
that the existence of a proposal often is the basis for
negotiations whereby firm policies or practices are changed to
obtain the withdrawal of a shareholder proposal.82 Proposals
thus can lead to very different results regardless of the vote
by the shareholders.

shareholder proposal in its proxy statement if: (i) the proposal deals with a
matter beyond the registrant’s power to effectuate; (ii) the proposal deals
with a matter relating to the conduct of ordinary business operations; (iii)
the proposal relates to director election by seeking to include a person for
election on management’s proxy materials, seeking to remove a director
from office, disqualify a present nominee or question the competence or
qualities of a nominee or director; (iv) the proposal conflicts with a proposal
to be submitted by the corporation at the same meeting; (v) the corporation
has already substantially implemented the proposal; and (vi) the proposal
is substantially duplicative of a proposal submitted to the corporation by
another shareholder that will be included in the corporation’s proxy
material for the meeting.
78 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j); see Matsusaka et al., supra note 49, at 112–
14.
79 See Matsusaka et al., supra note 49, at 112–14.
80 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
81 See infra note 150.
82 See Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach,
The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private
Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335–37 (1998).

No. 3:1147]

CREATING A CORPORATE PUBLIC SQUARE

1169

A. Qualifying the Proposal
A proponent’s eligibility to use Rule 14a-8 is the doorway
to the virtual public square.83 Prior to January 4, 2021,84 to
be eligible to submit a proposal, a shareholder was required to
own at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s
securities entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year
prior to the date on which the proposal is submitted. 85 For
resubmitted proposals, prior to January 4, 2021, the
restrictions provided that the proposal can be excluded if the
proposal: (1) deals with substantially the same subject matter
as a prior proposal that was submitted within the previous
five years; (2) is submitted for a meeting to be held within
three years of its last submission; (3) and either (i) the
proposal was submitted at only one meeting during the
previous five years and received less than three percent of the
votes, (ii) the proposal was submitted at two meetings during
the previous five years and received less than six percent of
votes at the time of its second submission, or (iii) the proposal
was submitted at three or more meetings during the previous
five years and received less than ten percent of votes at the
time of its last submission.86
Of particular importance for this Article, in 2020, the SEC
voted to raise significantly the standards for proponent
83 To be clear, we do support well-calibrated ownership criteria to be
eligible to use Rule 14a-8; as we develop, the rule springs from a provision
of the Securities Exchange Act focused on the shareholder franchise so that
it would be inappropriate to extend the right to non-shareholders. We do
believe there should be an amount of ownership requirement, with that
amount set with an eye toward not foreclosing proposals from a large sector
of retail investors so that some insight from the mode of retail holdings in a
large cohort of public firms would be useful in developing a minimum
holding amount.
84 Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 89,964, 84 Fed Reg.
70,240 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (amending Rule
14a-8(b), effective January 4, 2021).
85 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2021) (amended by Procedural
Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a8, 84 Fed Reg. at 70,240.
86 Id, § 240.14a-8(i)(12).
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stockownership and the criteria to be met to resubmit
proposals.87 The new rules provide that to be eligible to make
proposals under Rule 14a–8, submitting proposals must hold
at least $2,000 of the company’s securities for at least 3 years,
$15,000 of the company’s securities for at least 2 years, or
$25,000 of the company’s securities for at least 1 year (“New
Stockownership Restrictions”).88 Also, under the new rules, a
company may exclude a proposal from its proxy materials for
any meeting held within three years of the last time it was
included if the proposal received less than 5% of the vote if
proposed once within the preceding 5 years; less than 15% of
the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed
twice previously within the preceding 5 years; or less than
25% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if
proposed 3 times or more previously within the preceding 5
years (“New Resubmission Restrictions”).89
In proposing these changes, the SEC staff considered the
likely impact on the number of shareholder proposals.90 On
one hand, the New Stockownership Rules not unexpectedly
would have different effects depending on the length of the
proponent’s ownership in the company—if all the proponents
held their shares for at least three years, under the new rules
no higher ownership is imposed so there would be no
exclusionary impact.91 On the other hand, if the SEC assumed
that all proponents acquired their shares one year before the
meeting and held them through the meeting date, so that the
$25,000 threshold would apply, the increased dollar threshold
“would result in the exclusion of 51 percent of the proponents
(and 56 percent of the proposals that were submitted) to be
considered at the shareholder meeting held in 2018.”92
87 Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 84 Fed Reg. at 70,240.
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2021).
89 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(12).
90 Proposing Release, supra note 46.
91 Id. at 66,497.
92 Id. The SEC staff apparently attempted to submit an additional
report on the impact of the distribution of stockownership on the effect of
the New Stockownership Rules on the likely level of stockholder
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Moreover, the SEC opined that the disproportionate impact of
the New Stockownership Rules would fall on individual
proponents and on the number of corporate governance
proposals submitted.93 More generally, the SEC salved any
unease arising from reducing the overall number of
proponents and proposals by observing, “shareholders now
have alternative ways, such as through social media, to
communicate.”94

submissions using data provided by Broadridge Financial Services Inc.
However, this preliminary study appears to have been temporarily excluded
from public release at the request of the SEC’s chief economist. See
Memorandum from S.P. Kothari, Chief Economist, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
File S7-23-19, Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds
under
Exchange
Act
Rule
14a-8
(August
14,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-23-19/s72319-7645492-222330.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3GA-87MY] (“[I]t was my view that the preliminary draft
analysis was not relevant to the economic question central to the proposal
and that the data had limitations that reduced its potential value to
analyzing the proposal.”).
93 Proposing Release, supra note 46, at 66,499. The disproportionate
impact on individuals would arise because “the average holdings of retail
investors are typically lower than the average holdings of institutional
investors.” Id. The larger effect on corporate governance proposals stems
from the fact that “86 percent of the proposals submitted by individual
investors are governance proposals, whereas 47 percent of the proposals
submitted by institutional investors are governance proposals.” Id. (citation
omitted).
94 Id. at 66,462. There is a growing increase in engagement by financial
institutions with the management of portfolio companies. See Jeffrey D.
Karpf, Helena K. Grannis & Gaia Goffe, Shareholder Engagement Trends
and Considerations, CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publicationlisting/shareholder-engagement-trends-and-considerations
[https://perma.cc/A83J-XVTJ]. But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating BoardShareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 842-43 (2013)
(reasoning there is cause for skepticism of shareholder engagement not
involving blockholders); Amy Borrus, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional
Invs. et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Procedural Requirements
and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (July 29,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-23-19/s72319-7502063-221908.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7VE-VMU7]
(observing
engagement
by
some
blockholders with portfolio companies is not as encompassing as occurs
through an inclusive shareholder proposal rule).
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The Proposing Release also contains some estimates of the
impact of the New Resubmission Rules were they in effect
from 2011 to 2018: “[W]e estimate that the proposed
amendments to the resubmission thresholds would result in
an additional 212 resubmitted proposals being excludable (15
percent of the total resubmitted proposals in this
timeframe).”95 The SEC further observed that these cutbacks
are likely to fall particularly heavily on proposals raising
environmental and social issues. 96
In light of the SEC’s estimates of the large negative effects
of the New Stockownership Rules and the New Resubmission
Rules on the likely future use of the Rule, we believe it is
important to ask if the new rules are justified as consistent
with the important functions and goals served by the Rule. We
turn next to a detailed exploration of those goals and policy
objectives.

B. Legislative History, Regulatory Evolution and
Judicial Development of Rule 14a-8
The SEC created Rule 14a-8 pursuant to its rule making
authority set forth in section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,97 making it important to begin by examining the
purpose and history of that statute. The Exchange Act has two
overarching purposes: protecting investors engaged in
securities transactions and assuring public confidence in the
integrity of the securities markets.98 Central to achieving
these objectives, the Act created the SEC and, in section 14,
Proposing Release, supra note 46, at 66,500.
Id. at 66,500. One reason for this particularly adverse effect is that
proposals on environmental and social issues tend to receive lower levels of
voting support than do governance proposals. Id. A second reason is that
these proposals tend to be resubmitted more often than governance
proposals. Id. at 66,501.
97 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2018).
98 S. REP. NO. 100-265, at 46 (1987) (“The core of this ‘truth in securities’
law is a requirement that investors receive full and fair disclosure relating
to the securities they purchase.”); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (statement
of Franklin D. Roosevelt) (“[O]ur broad purpose [is to] . . . protect[] investors
and depositors.”).
95
96
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authorized it, among other tasks, to prescribe rules and
regulations with regard to proxy solicitation as it deems
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”99
The legislative history of section 14(a), however, is very
limited, and what does exist emphasizes the importance
Congress placed on assuring that stockholders of public
companies were adequately informed when exercising their
voting franchise through the execution of a proxy. For
example, a report by the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency in June 1934 (the “1934 Senate Report”) observes
that the objective of proxy regulation is to provide
shareholders with greater information to assist them in the
voting process—information about matters such as the
financial condition of the company, the major questions of
policy to be decided at shareholders’ meetings, and the
matters for which voting authority is sought through the
proxy.100 The report further states:
In order that the stockholder may have adequate
knowledge as to the manner in which his interests are
being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not
only as to the financial condition of the corporation,
but also as to the major questions of policy, which are
decided at stockholders’ meetings. Too often proxies
are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of
the real nature of the matter for which authority to
cast his vote is sought.101

The other key component of the Exchange Act’s legislative
history is the report prepared by the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce in August 1934 (the “1934 House
Report”) that details many unfair practices in the proxy
process.102 The report states, “Fair corporate suffrage is an
important right that should attach to every equity security

15 U.S.C. § 78n.
S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 74–77 (1934).
101 Id. at 74.
102 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
99

100
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bought on a public exchange.”103 Then the report continues to
describe the misuse of proxy rules by management:
Managements of properties owned by the investing
public should not be permitted to perpetuate
themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies.
Insiders having little or no substantial interest in the
properties they manage have often retained their
control without an adequate disclosure of their
interest and without an adequate explanation of the
management policies they intend to pursue. Insiders
have at times solicited proxies without fairly
informing the stockholders of the purposes for which
the proxies are to be used and have used such proxies
to take from the stockholders for their own selfish
advantage valuable property rights. Inasmuch as only
the exchanges make it possible for securities to be
widely distributed among the investing public, it
follows as a corollary that the use of the exchanges
should involve a corresponding duty of according to
shareholders fair suffrage. For this reason the
proposed bill gives the . . . Commission power to
control the conditions under which proxies may be
solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of
abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders.104

The above quotes from section 14’s legislative history are
viewed by commentators as amenable to two very different
interpretations: “(1) [I]t may suggest a role for shareholders
as decision makers with respect to corporate policy, or (2) it
may simply direct that shareholders receive information
about corporate policies and objectives in addition to
operating results.”105 We believe this legislative history
reflects that Congress was most likely focused on providing
disclosure to voting stockholders for the purpose of enhancing
the quality of their voting. Nonetheless, the quotes reflect a

Id.
Id. at 13–14.
105 Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy
Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1179 (1993).
103
104
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strong belief that proxy voting enables owner concerns to be
reflected in voting rather than just the interest of managers,
a thesis advanced in this Article. The 1934 House Report’s
concern that management’s interest is less than that of the
firm’s owners suggests the use of disclosures through the
proxy mechanism as an antidote for any misalignment of
interests; our view is the dialogue fostered in the virtual
public square by Rule 14a-8 can breed not only transparency
of management’s vision but better alignment of management
and shareholder interests, one of the initial purposes of the
proxy rule. Thus, as we will see, the SEC reflects this broader
view, albeit in a disclosure-oriented context.
The SEC’s views on the rationale for the rule have evolved
over time. When the SEC issued the shareholder proposal rule
in 1942, it was numbered Rule X-14A-7.106 It required that
stockholders making proposals for action which management
opposed must be allowed to include not more than one
hundred words to set forth their position in the proxy
statement.107 Since the inaugural shareholder proposal rule
106 General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1934, 7 Fed. Reg.
10,655, 10,656 (1942).
107 Id. The full text of Rule x-14A-7 provided:

In the event that a qualified security holder of the issuer
has given the management reasonable notice that such
security holder intends to present for action at a meeting of
security holders of the issuer a proposal which is a proper
subject for action by the security holders, the management
shall set forth the proposal and provide means by which
security holders can make a specification as provided in §
240.14a-2 [Rule X-14A-2]. Further, if the management
opposes such proposal, it shall, upon the request of such
security holder, include in its soliciting material the name
and address of such security holder and a statement of such
security holder setting forth the reasons advanced by him
in support of such proposal: Provided, however, That a
statement of reasons in support of a proposal shall not be
longer than 100 words and Provided further, That such
security holder and not the management shall be
responsible for such statement. For the purposes of this
rule notice given more than thirty days in advance of a day
corresponding to the date on which proxy soliciting
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predated the Administrative Procedures Act and its call for
rigor in connection with promulgating rules,108 the SEC did
not explain the background, purpose, or operation of this
shareholder proposal rule in its 1942 release. An intuitive
explanation for the rule is that of disclosure; a company
seeking proxies to be voted on any matter that may arise at
the upcoming meeting commits a glaring omission in failing
to disclose a matter to be voted on that it is aware will be
submitted by a shareholder. Given the rhetoric in the
preceding quotes from Senate and House reports regarding
the importance of managers being accountable to
shareholders in their management of the firm, especially the
characterization of disclosure as protection of the shareholder
voting franchise, the SEC naturally linked the need for
disclosure of a proposal to be voted on at an upcoming meeting
to management’s request from shareholders for a proxy to vote
on any matter at that meeting.
Subsequent SEC and judicial developments similarly
supported a broad mission for Rule 14a-8. In 1976, the SEC
proposed amendments to clarify several requirements
applicable to proponents.109 The 1976 release stated, “Section
14(a) of the Exchange Act . . . . was enacted to promote
corporate suffrage and to limit those situations in which
public corporations are controlled by a small number of

material was released to security holders in connection
with the last annual meeting of security holders shall,
prima facie, be deemed to be reasonable notice.
Id.
108 The Administrative Procedures Act was signed into law in 1946.
Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
109 Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,598,
Investment Company Act Release No. 9343, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,984
(proposed July 20, 1976) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The
amendments were officially adopted on December 3, 1976. Adoption of
Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, Investment Company Act Release No. 9539, 41 Fed.
Reg. 52,994, 52,994 (Dec. 3, 1976) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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persons.”110 The release further quoted from what would
become a highly influential decision of the D.C. Circuit,
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, stating that
“the overriding purpose of Section 14(a) ‘is to assure to
corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right—
some would say their duty—to control the important decisions
which affect them in their capacity as stockholders and
owners of the corporation.’”111
The scope of the SEC’s authority under section 14(a),
however, was later qualified in Business Roundtable v. SEC,
a case regarding the SEC’s reliance on the provision to impose
limits on the listing of dual-class voting structures.112 The
D.C. Circuit upheld the plaintiff’s claim the SEC lacked the
statutory authority under section 14(a) to address dual-class
voting shares as a way of promoting fair corporate suffrage.113
According to the court, Congress authorized the SEC to
regulate the proxy process primarily to ensure that
shareholders could exercise their votes on an informed
basis.114 Although the court acknowledged the SEC’s
authorization to enact regulations to promote “fair corporate
suffrage,” the court nonetheless concluded that Congress
intended the regulations to bear “almost exclusively on
disclosure” as the means of promoting fair corporate
suffrage.115 Because Business Roundtable addresses only the
authority of the SEC to proscribe dual-class voting, it did not
change the state-law based right of shareholders to submit
proposals for consideration by the shareholders at a
forthcoming meeting or for that matter whether a shareholder
110 Proposals by Security Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,984 (citing S. REP.
NO. 73-1455, at 12 (1934) and H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13–14 (1934)).
111 Id. (quoting Med. Cmt. For Human Rts. v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680–
81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972)).
112 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
113 Id. at 408.
114 Id. at 410.
115 Id. (“Proxy solicitations are, after all, only communications with
potential absentee voters. The goal of federal proxy regulation was to
improve those communications and thereby to enable proxy voters to control
the corporation as effectively as they might have by attending a shareholder
meeting.”).
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proposal involving dual-class voting is a proper subject under
Rule 14a-8. This state-based right can be understood to imply
that a proposal must be included on the firm’s proxy
statement. Thus, Business Roundtable posed little threat to
the validity of Rule 14a-8. The SEC has continued to justify
its rulemaking as, at least partially, driven by the goal of
promoting fair corporate suffrage. For instance, in 1992, the
SEC proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8 to facilitate
shareholder communication and enhance informed proxy
voting, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy
rules.116 In explaining its proposal, the SEC stated, “the
Commission has focused on the role of its proxy and disclosure
rules in impeding shareholder communication and
participation in the corporate governance process, in order to
further Congress’ intent to assure fair, informed and effective
shareholder suffrage.”117
However, in 1997, the SEC, recasting Rule 14a-8 in a
question & answer format, emphasized shareholder
communication rather than fair suffrage as the rule’s guiding
purpose.
Rule 14a8 provides, and then regulates, a channel of
communication among, and between shareholders and
companies. It is not the only avenue for
communication, since a shareholder may undertake
an independent proxy solicitation or may seek
informal discussions with management or other
shareholders outside the proxy process. Rule 14a-8 is
popular because it provides an opportunity for any
shareholder owning a relatively small amount of the
company’s shares to have his or her own proposal
placed alongside management’s proposals in the

116 Regulations of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,849, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,803, 51
SEC Docket 1208, 1224 (proposed June 23, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
117 Id. at 1226.
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company’s proxy materials for presentation to a vote
at an annual or special meeting of shareholders.118

In other words, the SEC justified the shareholder proposal
rule as a means of facilitating small shareholder
communication amongst themselves and with management.
The SEC continued to cite “fair corporate suffrage” as a
goal of the rule in its 2007 proposals concerning bylaw
proposals for shareholder nominations of directors and
electronic shareholder forums.119 The SEC observed that
Congress intended that Section 14(a) give the
Commission “the power to control the conditions
under which proxies may be solicited,” and that this
power be exercised “as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”
Because the Commission’s authority under Section
14(a) encompasses both disclosure and proxy
mechanics, the proxy rules have long governed not
only the information required to be disclosed to ensure
that shareholders receive full disclosure of all
information that is material to the exercise of their
voting rights under state law and the corporation’s
charter, but also the procedure for soliciting
proxies.120

More recently, in 2019, when the SEC proposed
amendments to proponents’ eligibility requirements and
118 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 62 Fed. Reg.
50,582 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
(emphasis added). The SEC finally modified the rule into a question &
answer format in 1998. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63
Fed. Reg. 29,106 (May 28, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
119 Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
120 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted) (first quoting H.R. REP. NO. 731383, at 14 (1934); and then quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006)) The SEC’s
2007 release cited comments from Professor John C. Coffee Jr., who said
that “Section 14(a) ‘does not focus exclusively on disclosure; rather, it
contemplates SEC rules regulating procedure in order to grant shareholders
a “fair” right of corporate suffrage.’” Id. at 43,467 n.12 (quoting John C.
Coffee Jr., Corporate Securities; Federalism and the SEC’s Proxy Proposals,
231 N.Y.L.J. 5 (March 18, 2004)).
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proposal number,121 the SEC emphasized that the proxy
solicitation process has become the forum within which
shareholder suffrage occurs:
Under state corporate law, shareholders have the
right to vote their shares to elect directors and to
approve or reject major corporate transactions at
shareholder meetings, and shareholders may appoint
proxies to vote on their behalf at such meetings.
Because most shareholders do not attend public
company shareholder meetings in person and,
instead, vote their shares by the use of proxies that
are solicited before the shareholder meeting takes
place, the proxy solicitation process rather than the
shareholder meeting itself has become the “forum for
shareholder suffrage.”122

Our view for a SEC-created town square rests on the
reality that the proxy solicitation has effectively replaced the
in-person
exchanges
that
once
occurred
among
123
shareholders. Moreover, the SEC’s view in the above quote
is consistent with the broad nature of our corporate public
square idea: The shareholder proposal rule facilitates
dialogue among shareholders of all sizes as well as greater
awareness within the managerial and investor communities
of an ever evolving range of issues, including the intensity of
beliefs on those issues. As a communication device, it
distributes information among shareholders that enriches
their understanding of the corporation’s operations. As such,
proposals thereby enrich the environment in which
shareholders exercise their right of suffrage.

Proposing Release, supra note 46.
Id. at 66,458–59 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citation omitted)
(quoting Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders 47 Fed.
Reg. 47,420, 47,421 (proposed Oct. 26, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240); Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,984
(proposed July 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275);
and Roosevelt v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)).
123 See id.
121
122
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C. Analysis of the Legislative History and Policy
Justifications for Rule 14a-8
As discussed below, commentators differ over whether
Congress’ objectives in enacting section 14(a) were limited to
furthering disclosure or also included promoting fair corporate
suffrage.124 Proponents of the rule tend to cite to the House
Report, whereas detractors favor the Senate Report as
summarized in the next section.

1. Legislative History Debate
Relying on the limited legislative materials examined
above,125 several commentators argue the rule is limited to
increasing disclosure in connection with the proxy process or
beyond,126 while others claim that the rule authorizes the SEC
to address questions of substantive fairness in the voting

124 See generally Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the
Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425 (1984) (arguing disclosure
only); George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure,
30 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (arguing disclosure only); Patrick J. Ryan,
Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy,
23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988) (discussing different views of the rule); Milton V.
Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s
Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549 (1957) (arguing for promotion of corporate
democracy); David C. Bayne, The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U.
DET. L.J. 575 (1957) (arguing for promotion of corporate democracy); Frank
D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The
Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952) (arguing for promotion of
corporate democracy). At least one scholar has concluded that, “[t]he
statutory language and legislative history are ambiguous as to whether the
SEC is authorized to enact rules with a substantive effect on corporate
governance or simply to implement disclosure requirements.” Fisch, supra
note 105, at 1179.
125 See supra Section III.B.
126 See e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws
at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1071, 1118 (1992) (“A federal right to
full disclosure and fair procedures does not equal a federal right to wage
proxy contests. Rather, the legislative history reflects a congressional desire
to do nothing more than enable shareholders to make effective use of
whatever voting rights they possess by virtue of state law.”).
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process to promote “corporate democracy.”127 The “disclosure
only” oriented commentators argue that the shareholder
proposal rule itself developed as an adjunct to the SEC’s
disclosure requirements,128 mainly basing their arguments on
the misuse of proxy rules described in 1934 Senate Report.
For example, Professor Bainbridge supports the
disclosure-oriented justification, claiming that Congress did
not intend to regulate substantive issues such as when
shareholders are entitled to vote; instead it sought to ensure
shareholders receive full disclosure and procedural fairness
when state law gives them an opportunity to vote.129 He
argues that Congress did not intend the SEC, in regulating
the solicitation of proxies, to affect the substantive voting
rights of shareholders.130 In his view, although the 1934
House Report makes reference to fair corporate suffrage,
nothing in it concerned substantive aspects of shareholders’
voting rights; the sole focus is on providing full disclosure and
fair procedures.131 Bainbridge believes that when Congress
spoke of fair corporate suffrage, it meant that shareholders
should be allowed to make an independent, informed decision
when asked to exercise the franchise, leaving it to the states
to determine when shareholders are entitled to exercise the
franchise as well as other substantive corporate governance
questions.132 He concludes that the legislative history reflects
a congressional desire to do nothing more than enable

127 See e.g., Ryan, supra note 124, at 103, 140 (discussing different
views of the rule); Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 24, at 638–39 (“[T]he rule
is designed to provide shareholders an opportunity to express their point of
view on issues affecting the corporation for the purpose either of holding
management accountable or of influencing management’s actions with
respect to those issues).
128 See generally Note, Liberalizing SEC Rule 14a-8 Through the Use
of Advisory Proposals, 80 Yale L.J. 845, 847–848 (1971); Fisch, supra note
105, at 1179.
129 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 126, at 1112.
130 Id. at 1116.
131 Id. at 1111–12.
132 Id.at 1116.
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shareholders to make effective use of whatever voting rights
they possess by virtue of state law.133
In contrast to this “disclosure only” view are commentators
who emphasize the 1934 House Report’s statement that, “Fair
corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to
every equity security bought on a public exchange.” 134 This
group of commentators argue the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce understood the importance
of shareholders’ role in corporate governance.135 The 1934
House Report indicates that proxy regulation demanded a
new system of “fair corporate suffrage,” which would prevent
improper self-perpetuation by management and limit abuse
by those in control.136 Thus, Professor Ryan concludes from
the legislative history that the SEC’s proxy regulation power
was designed to protect the shareholder voice in control of the
corporation,137 making it essential to the successful
functioning of corporate democracy.138 In this view, “[t]he
shareholder proposal rule gives shareholders what amounts
to a right to weigh in and influence management.”139
In a highly significant article, Professors Schwartz and
Weiss develop a broad interpretation of Rule 14a-8, arguing
that if the SEC only intended to increase disclosure, it could
accomplish that goal by a more simple disclosure requirement
to the company.140 “The more detailed requirements of the
shareholder proposal rule,” they state, “reflect an effort on the
part of the SEC to act in what it deems ‘the public interest.’”141
We endorse this view and find it consistent with our view of
the Rule as creating a corporate public square. Schwartz and
Id. at 1117.
Ryan, supra note 127, at 139 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 1314 (1934)).
135 Id. at 140 (describing shareholder participation in the governance
of the company in the legislative record).
136 Id. at 139 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13-14 (1934)).
137 Id. at 140.
138 Id. at 97.
139 Haan, supra note 29, at 291 (emphasis omitted).
140 Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 24, at 638.
141 Id.
133
134
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Weiss further reason that “the shareholder proposal rule
provides a relatively unique opportunity to question
management” and improve management’s action by
compelling it to respond more meaningfully to shareholder
questions and to publish the question and response.142
We believe that the corporate public square is in the public
interest and will benefit all of the corporation’s stakeholders
as well as the public because it will foster greater
communication amongst them and corporate management.

2. Theoretical and Policy Arguments
In addition to the legislative history debate, there are a
number of policy and theoretical arguments to consider.143
From a theoretical perspective, shareholders have voting
rights for a number of good reasons: the shareholder vote can
play a monitoring role;144 it can provide a “superior
information aggregation device for private information held
by shareholders when there is uncertainty about the correct
decision;”145 and it provides “an efficient mechanism for
aggregating heterogeneous preferences when the decision
differentially affects shareholders.”146 Under this view,
shareholders should vote on low-dollar immediate value
issues, such as Rule 14-8 shareholder proposals, where the
subject may have an effect on the long-term value of the
142 Id. at 641; see also Freeman. supra note 124, at 551 (“[M]anagement
must prepare and circulate a formal justification of its own position in
opposition to the shareholder”). Critics have questioned whether
shareholders are really ever asking questions seeking an answer. See Dent
Jr., supra note 124, at 17 (“[T]he proponent is rarely seeking an answer to
a question.”).
143 For an extensive review of the academic literature on shareholder
proposals, see Haan, supra note 29, at 288 n.101.
144 Edelman et al., supra note 5, at 1378. The monitoring function of
shareholder voting is limited to issues that affect the stock price
immediately or in the long run, where the board is conflicted or likely to be
captured, and the benefits of voting exceed its costs. This rationale will not
apply to issues with little impact on the long-run value of the company. Id.
at 1380.
145 Id. at 1378.
146 Id.
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firm.147 Because empirical evidence on whether shareholder
votes on Rule 14a-8 proposals enhance long-run value is
mixed,148 we do not rely upon the monitoring rationale as a
theoretical justification for the Rule.
However, the preference aggregation justification for the
vote supports Rule 14a-8 because “a shareholder vote acts as
a measure of the intensity of shareholders’ interests, more
accurately conveying to the board the concerns and beliefs of
the shareholders.”149 Even though shareholder proposals are
often technically advisory, boards often implement proposals
that garner a majority of shareholder votes.150 In any case, in
considering future actions, the board will be in a better
position to balance the interests of the firm’s stakeholders so
that management’s decision-making may be improved.151
Others also credit Rule 14a-8 with providing valuable
information. Professor Freeman believes the rule provides
shareholders an opportunity to express their point of view on
issues that impact the corporation for the purpose either of
holding management accountable or of influencing
management’s actions with respect to those issues.152
Similarly, Professor Ryan points out that the rule permits the
expression of shareholder opinions about corporate affairs
that differ from management’s views, and that it serves to

Id. at 1421.
See He et al., supra note 48, at 1.
149 Thomas & Edelman, supra note 23.
150 Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and
Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism, 34
REV. FIN. STUD. 5629, 5632 (2020). However, there are still proposals that
receive a majority of shareholder votes that are not then implemented by
the company. See Yonca Ertimu, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben,
Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from
Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 54 (2010) (finding that, among
S&P 1500 firms in 2004, forty percent of majority-vote proposals were
implemented).
151 See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 23; Ryan, supra note 124, at
112.
152 Freeman, supra note 124, at 556.
147
148
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engage the corporate players in a dialogue about broader
corporate, social and economic concerns.153
Another benefit Rule 14a-8 accords is it provides the
individual shareholder the right to demand and receive from
management a public justification of its action.154
Shareholder proposals “elicit[] a reasonably full exposition of
management’s point of view concerning the issues raised by
the shareholder proponents.” 155 As Professor Ryan notes,
“[u]nlike other sources of information available to
management, such as stock market performance, shareholder
proposals are infrequent and harder to overlook or
misinterpret.”156 He also reasons, “a shareholder proposal,
and management’s response to it, may force management to
articulate its reasons for pursuing a particular policy.”157 This
may improve managerial decision-making by “facilitating
information gathering, analysis, and dissemination.”158
As supporters of Rule 14a-8, Professors Schwartz and
Weiss think that Rule 14a-8 is justified by its constructive
impact on corporate behavior.159 They argue that “[i]n
numerous instances, corporations have taken actions that
were either tied directly to or seemingly stimulated by
shareholder proposals.”160 They also claim that Rule 14a-8,
when compared with the “Wall Street Rule” (i.e., if you
disagree with management, you should sell your stock),
provides the interested investor with an opportunity to voice
its concerns while keeping its stock.161

Ryan, supra note 124, at 99, 181.
Freeman, supra note 124, at 551.
155 Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 24, at 641.
156 Ryan, supra note 124, at 112.
157 Id.
158 Haan, supra note 29, at 292.
159 Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 24, at 642.
160 Id. at 642–43.
161 Id. at 642. Professor Liebeler notes that “[t]o the extent that
stockholders attempt to use Rule 14a-8 instead of selling their shares, the
market for corporate control works less effectively”. Liebeler, supra note
124, at 448.
153
154
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The legislative history and academic commentary about
Rule 14a-8 suggest that its purpose is far bigger than just
ensuring fair voting. We believe that Rule 14a-8, among other
things, offers a mechanism for raising issues to be considered
within the firm’s boardroom and executive suite that
otherwise may not be focused upon. The shareholder proposal
rule thereby enriches the information environment in which
management operates and by which the board oversees
management’s stewardship. The latter is an especially
important contribution in an era in which ESG is enjoying
such an important role among investors.162
In the next Part, we provide an overview of the empirical
literature on how Rule 14a-8 has been used in recent years.

IV. INSIGHTS FROM EMPIRCAL STUDIES OF RULE
14A-8
Not surprisingly, experience under Rule 14a-8 has been
extensively studied.163 Indeed, it is a natural target for
empirical investigation as there is a diverse cast of proponents
and firms targeted by proposals, a broad range of subjects
covered by proposals that are nonetheless amenable to
classification in discrete but broad categories, and an equally
observable range of outcomes for proposals.164 Resolution
proponents typically are individuals, labor pension funds, or
financial institutions.165 A subset within individual
proponents are so-called gadflies, an important group as they
regularly lodge a disproportionate percentage of all
proposals.166 A recent study by Gantchev and Giannetti of
shareholder proposals raised between 2003 and 2014 found
For discussion, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
For a recent survey article of the empirical literature, see Matthew
R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty Years of
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN.
405 (2017).
164 See generally Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of
Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 167
(2011).
165 Id. at 170–171.
166 Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5630.
162
163
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three gadflies initiated nearly half of all individual sponsored
proposals.167 Among the institutional category, the same
study found public pension funds enjoy greater support for
their proposals, on average, though they bring forward fewer
proposals than labor pension funds. 168 Not surprisingly,
investment companies do not resort to Rule 14a-8 due to
potential conflicts of interests. 169 Larger corporations are
subject to a disproportionate share of all shareholder
proposals.170 Among the outcomes observed are the
withdrawal of a proposal, the company seeking an SEC noaction letter, the grant or denial of such a letter, or an actual
shareholder vote on the proposal.171
How has the Rule been used in the past and by whom?
Several empirical studies have shown that the shareholder
proposal rule has played a positive role in corporate
governance reform. One recent study by Kosmas
Papadopoulos of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
shows that shareholder proposals have spurred the adoption
of a variety of governance best practices over the past three
decades.172 Shareholder proposal campaigns enabled
corporate practices such as annual director elections, majority
vote rules for director elections, shareholder approval for
poison pills, and proxy access bylaws to become common
practice.173 In contrast, approximately twenty-five percent of
shareholder proposals relate to environmental and social
issues, for which shareholder support, although growing
rapidly, nonetheless rarely exceeds fifty percent.174 There is

Id. at 5637 tbl.1.
Id.
169 Id. at 11.
170 Id. at 5640 tbl.2 (finding statistically significant correlation
between market capitalization and probability of being targeted by
shareholder proposals).
171 Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021,
1045 (1999).
172 Papadopoulos, supra note 52.
173 Id.
174 He et al., supra note 48, at 1.
167
168
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mixed evidence on the question of whether these
environmental and social proposals have led to changes of
corporate practices or firm value.175
One prominent recent study of shareholder proposal
proponents and their success is by Professors Renneboog and
Szilagyi. They analyzed 2,436 proposals submitted between
1996 and 2005.176 Among other things, they found that:
i. union pension funds were the most prolific with 810
submissions, including 506 between 2003 and 2005;177
ii. public pension funds submitted 116 proposals;
iii. investment funds submitted 39 proposals;
iv. coordinated investor groups such as the Investor Rights
Association of America submitted 170 proposals;
v. socially responsible and religious investors submitted
112 proposals; and
vi. the overwhelming majority of the remaining 1189
proposals were submitted by individuals, who
dominated the proxy process almost entirely until the
mid-1980s.178
The most prominent individual gadfly investors have been
active for many years and include Evelyn Y. Davis and the
Chevedden, Rossi, and Gilbert families, who together
submitted 516 of the 2,436 studied proposals. 179

Id. at 1 n.1.
Renneboog & Szilagyi, supra note 164, at 170.
177 A concern with labor fund proposals is evidence they use the
shareholder proposal rule strategically to garner benefits at the negotiating
table, launching more proposals during period of contract renewal, and
dropping the proposals after obtaining benefits at the bargaining table.
John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan, Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals
by Union Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUDS. 3215, 3215–16.
178 Renneboog & Szilagyi, supra note 164, at 170–71.
179 Id. at 171. There are several other papers that document the
proponent types for shareholder proposals. See, e.g., Matsusaka et al., supra
note 179; Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, 5637 tbl.1. For example,
John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas, and Irene Yi analyze shareholder
proposals received by Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 index companies during
the period 1997-2013. Matsusaka et al., supra note 177, at 3224. They
categorize proponent types and number of their proposals and find that
individuals and union pension funds are the most frequent proponents, with
175
176
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Professors Renneboog and Szilagyi further show that
takeover-related proposals performed well irrespective of the
proposal’s sponsor.180 Otherwise, public pension funds and
investment funds were the most successful in building voting
coalitions, with an average 44.1% and 42.6% of the votes,
respectively.181 Union pension funds won a lower share of the
votes at 35.6%, which may reflect shareholder concerns over
their political or social agendas, but is also consistent with the
greater diversity of their proposal objectives.182 The
percentage votes achieved by coordinated investor groups and
socially responsible and religious investors were 29.7% and
20.4%, respectively.183 Finally, individual activists attracted
an average 33.1% of votes cast. However, several gadfly
investors popular in the business media were very successful
in gathering voting support, with the Chevedden and Rossi
families achieving particularly strong voting outcomes. 184
Especially helpful in evaluating not just Rule 14a-8, and
supportive of our suggestion of orienting the Rule toward
nurturing a corporate public square, is the recent study by
Gantchev and Giannetti that used data on 4,878 shareholder
proposals between 2003 and 2014 for all firms in the Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) 1500 index.185 The issue that concerns them is
whether harmful proposals can, despite their effect, receive
majority support and then destroy shareholder value if they
are subsequently implemented. In particular, they investigate
whether gadflies that submit many one-size-fits-all
shareholder proposals every year are thereby adversely
affecting targeted firms.186
They find that firms targeted by individuals do not differ
in any meaningful way from firms targeted by institutions—
public pension funds, religious groups, and socially responsible investors
also frequent proponents. Id.
180 Renneboog & Szilagyi, supra note 176, at 172.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150.
186 Id. at 5630.
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both target firms that are all relatively large and have
reported low profitability.187 About twenty percent of the
proposals voted on garnered a majority or greater vote, with
individuals the most frequent proponents accounting for over
thirty-five percent of all proposals voted on at meetings.188
Proposals submitted by individuals were more likely to be
approved than those submitted by institutions.189
The study’s authors document that a small group of
individual gadfly investors submit a disproportionate number
of proposals. These individual sponsors, such as John
Chevedden and William Steiner, do not acquire large stakes
and are not particularly wealthy, but they submit dozens of
shareholder proposals every year, convinced that “it is the
right thing to do.”190 Recently, Professors Yaron Nili and Kobi
Kastiel extolled the virtues of gadflies, reporting that, even
though gadflies account for 27.3% of all proposals during their
study period, they were behind 53% of proposals submitted to
the S&P 1500 that received majority support.191 They also
found that in nearly two-thirds of the instances in which
gadfly sponsored proposals received majority support,
management followed up with a proposal to modify the
company’s governance terms, a success rate above that of
Id. at 5637.
Id. at 5636–37.
189 There is a conflict in the studies over whether proposals submitted
by individuals are more likely to pass than proposals submitted by
institutions. Compare Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate
Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional
Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 288 (2000) (finding proposals sponsored by
individuals less likely to pass) with Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150,
at 5636 (finding shareholder proposals by individuals more likely to pass).
The sample period for Gillan & Starks is much earlier than that of the other
study, suggesting a change in behavior may have occurred over time.
Compare Gillian & Starks, supra, at 275 (analyzing proposals between 1987
and 1994) with Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5635 (studying
proposals between 2003 and 2014).
190 Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5634.
191 Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies
20, 24 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studs., Working Paper No. 1523, 2020)
(examining 6,827 shareholder proposals between 2005 and 2018 among the
S&P 1500).
187
188
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pension funds.192 Much of the success enjoyed by gadflies is
attributed to their strategy focusing on standardized
governance proposals that are recognized to have a good deal
of salience among institutional investors.193
However, Gantchev and Giannetti project a much darker
view of gadflies, reporting that proposals by such active
individuals receive the lowest percentage of votes across a
range of types of proposals and only are implemented by
boards three percent of the time, whereas overall the
implementation rate for majority-passed proposals is twelve
percent.194 This is a significant observation as it suggests
gadflies’ proposals, which, if broadly viewed, can be seen as
the generic equivalent to that of an institution or non-active
individual, perform less well in the particular setting because,
as the authors explain, the proposals submitted by gadflies
are not tailored to the conditions that surround the targeted
firm. And this is understood by the stockholders: if the
gadflies’ proposals obtain majority voting support this
“trigger[s] sales by informed mutual funds that voted against
them and, arguably as a consequence, negative abnormal
returns.”195 They also find that “proposals by [gadflies]
destroy shareholder value if they are implemented.” 196
However, “there are benefits from the implementation of
other individuals’ proposals,” and these large benefits must be
weighed against the costs associated with implemented gadfly
proposals, “cast[ing] doubt on the desirability of limiting
individual shareholder proposals.”197 The authors caution the
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30–32.
194 Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5642. The authors argue
that even this small percentage of proposals destroy value when they are
implemented, but that boards do so because they fear “the personal
consequences arising from ISS withhold-vote recommendations, which are
typically issued when majority-supported proposals are not implemented,
regardless of their quality.” Id. at 5631.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 5630 We note that this study is still a working paper at the
time of this writing and therefore this conclusion is subject to potential
revision.
197 Id. at 5650–51.
192
193
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SEC to weigh both the benefits of the other individuals’
proposals against the costs associated with the gadflies’
proposals before deciding whether to limit individual
proposals overall.198 We share this view.

V. WHAT IS THE REAL PURPOSE OF RULE 14A-8?
THE CORPORATE PUBLIC SQUARE
How should we evaluate the worth of a shareholder
proposal? Answering this question and applying it collectively
across at least recent experiences under Rule 14a-8 would
guide us to considering how it may be improved. From the
multiple foci of the studies reviewed in the preceding Part, we
can see their authors’ focus on the voting outcome as the
currency they use to measure the worth of a proposal or even
its proponent.199 The SEC followed a similar approach in
supporting the rule changes it adopted in 2019, as it
emphasized the approved/not approved record proposals had
before the voting shareholders.200
We believe there are several reasons why assessing the
value of Rule 14a-8, and for that matter the worth of any
reform matter, requires looking beyond the voting outcome.
For one, it is important to recognize the value associated with
proposals that are withdrawn by their proponent. Nearly one-

Id. at 5651.
We also observe that the empiricists’ focus on voting outcomes also
resonates the general complaint regarding the impacts of Rule 14a-8. Rule
14a-8 has many policy critics. For example, Professor Dent argues that the
SEC should not force companies to devote significant resources to
circulating proposals that have virtually no chance of being adopted. See
Dent Jr., supra note 124, at 17; Professor Liebeler also notes that there is
no reason to expect security holders to express their dissatisfaction through
shareholder resolutions as long as they are able to sell their shares. See
Liebeler, supra note 124, at 447.
200 Proposing Release, supra note 46, at 66,484 figs.7A & B, 66,485
fig.7C, 66,486 figs 8A & B, 66,587 fig.8C (collecting data on proposals
garnering shareholder approval overall, type of proponent and type of
proposal).
198
199
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half of all submitted proposals are withdrawn.201 Opponents
of the shareholder proposal rule could reason the high
withdrawal rate reflects a proponent acting, at last, sensibly
in reaching the conclusion advanced by management that the
proposal was ill-conceived and not in the interest of the
company or its shareholders. But there is evidence that the
withdrawal is a settlement between the proponent and the
company.202 Where this happens, there is every reason to
believe the proposal produced more than nothing so that such
settlements should be weighed in the calculus of the social
benefits of Rule 14a-8.
The withdrawal itself, especially as a result of a
settlement, suggests another benefit, namely facilitating
shareholder dialogue with the company. That is, the proposal
itself was the vehicle for dialogue. To be sure, a blockholder
can be expected to enjoy access to the company’s management
because of the attention its sizable holdings attract. The
smaller shareholder lacks this magnetism. On the other hand,
the withdrawal record among individual shareholders
suggests to us that a shareholder proposal does fill the void by
attracting management’s attention. We do not know how often
withdrawals occur because of negotiations, but strongly
suspect the number of instances is substantially greater than
trivial. This at least means that focusing on the win-loss
voting record before the shareholders understates the value of
a rule that facilitates proposals, but also means the
shareholder proposal rule has the additional benefit of
enabling a dialogue between the corporation and its
shareholders. Enabling dialogue is empowering for small

201 Id. at 66,478 fig.2 (finding that, in 2018, there were 831 proposals
of which 123 were omitted, 447 were voted upon, and 261 (31.4%) that were
withdrawn).
202 Rob Bauer, Frank Moers & Michael Viehs, Who Withdraws
Shareholder Proposals and Does It Matter? An Analysis of Sponsor Identity
and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE 472, 477 tbl.1. 484 (2015) (finding
that over the past few decades there has been a significant increase in the
number of ESG proposals that are withdrawn because of a settlement
reached between the proponent and the company).

No. 3:1147]

CREATING A CORPORATE PUBLIC SQUARE

1195

shareholders who lack the gravitas that surrounds a
blockholder that can earn a meeting with management.
Resting the worth of Rule 14a-8 on the number of instances
proposals garner majority support with the stockholders
further overlooks the arch of history with shareholder votes.
Dramatic instances exist where practices first advanced as
shareholder proposals became widely adopted across public
companies, not because they initially won a majority vote but
because their proponents’ persistence over a multi-year
campaign shined a light on the need for reforms that were
ultimately judged a good development.203 A classic example is
the movement to separate the positions of CEO and board
chair. Though the proposal garnered mixed results in
shareholder votes, firms may choose this course of action even
without a compelling positive shareholder vote. The point is
that focusing only on the win-loss record within firms targeted
by a proposal overlooks the role that proposal has at nontargeted firms. Thus, the shareholder proposal rule enjoys
substantial positive externalities, uncaptured by the win-loss
record, that that must be considered in evaluating its worth.
We therefore take a more holistic approach and consider
Rule 14a-8’s potential in light of the broad sweep of
contemporary corporate governance. There is a broad call for
corporations to balance the pursuit of shareholder wealth
against a range of social concerns in which attention is to be
given to stakeholder interests.204 This cascade of interest is
joined by calls that management and owners should
collaborate in pursuing long-term interests rather than shortterm gain.205 The latter has gained a good deal of traction

203 See Rosanna Landis-Weaver, Protecting the Shareholder Proposal
Process,
AS
YOU
SOW
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.asyousow.org/blog/2018/11/19/sec-shareholder-proxy-process
[https://perma.cc/G3LC-WYJN] (noting that “support grows slowly” for
issues addressed in multi-year proposals, which initially “do not receive
significant shareholder support” but “are no less critical”).
204 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, A Revised Monitoring
Model Confronts Today’s Movement Toward Managerialism, 99 TEX. L. REV.
1275, 1301 (2021).
205 Id. at 1294–1295.
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across corporate America under the rubric of the New
Paradigm where on-going dialogue, not confrontational
battles for control, is prescribed.206 We therefore place the
future of Rule 14a-8 within this constellation, seeing it as yet
another medium for the owners’ voice to reach the suites of
corporate executives. To be sure, there are multiple mediums
for that voice to be heard and for its impact to be felt. In
another era, the takeover was the popular method and today
there are activist investors. Nonetheless, both those forces,
largely out of economic considerations, often target small
firms, as the capital needed for a credible threat was too great
for large firms.207 We can thus see the role of Rule 14a-8
complementing these more adversarial engagements208 while
at the same time targeting firms that were less likely to be the
target of takeovers in the past or of activist investors today.
Moreover, the data reviewed earlier reflected that a
significant portion of Rule 14a-8 proposals are by individuals,
not institutions;209 this comports with the reality that
individual investors, unlike institutions, cannot undertake
one-on-one dialogue with company management. And, the
negligible number of shareholder proposals sponsored by
mutual funds is consistent with their well-documented
custom of engaging portfolio companies through direct
discussion.210 Nonetheless, dialogue between investor and
management is not as public as a shareholder proposal.
Hence, proponents of a governance issue or an approach to
sustainability who wish to shine a light on the issue can reach
a much broader audience via Rule 14a-8 than one-on-one
dialogue with a company’s management. That is, the proposal
and the shareholder vote that flow from a proposal launched
under Rule 14a-8 enjoy a broad audience, one that is certainly
Id. at 1297–1298.
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1747, 1752 (2008).
208 Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5639 (shareholder
proposals are “an important complementary mechanism of external
corporate governance.”).
209 See supra Part IV.
210 See id.
206
207

No. 3:1147]

CREATING A CORPORATE PUBLIC SQUARE

1197

more inclusive than that engaging in a dialogue with
management. Moreover, the transparency of the Rule 14a-8
process, not the least of which is the proxy solicitation process,
affords the proponent much more hydraulic pressure than can
ever arise in the one-off consultation process.
Rule 14a-8 therefore should be seen as a public, not a
private, forum. It is now very much a forum where
management and investors can witness the contesting visions
among investors and between investors and management.
Such exchanges promote discussion, reflection, study, and the
evolution of corporate governance as well as the mission of the
company. In an era of rising interest in both ESG and
company responsiveness to stakeholders as well as
shareholders, there is a heightened need for evolving values
among shareholders to be broadly communicated to
management, shareholders, and the public. The vision is that
the shareholder proposal rule is the corporate public square.

VI. CONCLUSION
In our critique of assessing the contributions of Rule 14a-8
by focusing on the level of support garnered in the voting on a
proposal we observed that the value of Rule 14a-8 is much
broader as it must be understood as a communication
mechanism among the proponent, the corporation and its
management, the company shareholders, the corporation to
its various non-shareholder stakeholders, and to boardrooms
and investors everywhere. It enables shareholders to
communicate within these networks the intensity of feeling
and beliefs on a breadth of concerns. Just as the ancient
Greeks and Romans, and more recently Europeans and
Americans, built their cities around the public square, from
the beginning of its classical conception, the public square is
featured as a core element of public discourse in urban life.211

211 As Michael Kimmelman writes in City Squares, “a successful square
is not just about light, air, proportion, and people. It must also give form to
some shared notion of civic identity.” See Michael Kimmelman, Culture: the
Power of Place: Introduction, in CITY SQUARES: EIGHTEEN WRITERS ON THE
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Rule 14a-8 should be viewed as creating the functional
equivalent of the public square where corporate management
and directors can take the pulse of their shareholders and
even extrapolate from that measurement the views of various
stakeholders, and more generally the public, as part of their
ongoing processing of information about the environment to
be navigated to conduct the firm’s business.
The legislative history and academic commentary about
the Rule suggest that it embraces a bigger role than
regulating only the mechanical action of shareholder voting.
The shareholder proposal rule serves many other functions as
well: It informs the board about the views of its investors and
stakeholders; it promotes active investor involvement with
the company; it can lead to valuable corporate governance
changes; and it provides the board with alternative views of
the firm’s objectives so that it does not become over-reliant on
corporate management. Each of these we believe are highly
valuable contributions to the board’s information base.
We believe that the Rule can perform all of these functions
and thus facilitate the opening of a corporate public square
while remaining consistent with its legislative history and the
SEC’s interpretation of that history over time. However, if
necessary, we would ask Congress to authorize the Rule’s use
to facilitate the creation of a corporate public square.
Finally, we are concerned that gadfly investors are making
an excessive number of proposals that decrease the value of
targeted firms. At least one empirical study has found that
gadfly proposals that obtain majority voting support and are
implemented by the targeted firms lead to negative effects on
firm value.212 However, other individual investors’ proposals
appear to be value enhancing so we cannot endorse overall
cutbacks on proposals by all individual proponents. We urge
the SEC to take a cautious approach to this issue and to
generate studies of the comparative value of shareholder
proposals by the different proponents before taking action to
directly limit individual proposals.
SPIRIT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SQUARES AROUND THE WORLD 1, 8 (Catie Marron
ed., 2016).
212 See Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 150, at 5630.

